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Show Quality Quarter Horse 
Auctions: Price Determinants 
and Buy-Back Practices 
Mykel R. Taylor, Kevin C. Dhuyvetter, 
Terry L. Kastens, Megan Douthit, and Thomas L. Marsh 
This study estimates the price determinants of  show quality quarter horses sold at 
auction. Several characteristics including genetic and physical traits, quality of 
pedigree, and performance record of  the horse, as well as the horse's offspring, were 
found to significantly impact selling price. Sale order positively affected price and 
appears to be driven by  buyers rather than intentional ordering of  the horses. A 
common practice at horse auctions is for the seller to reject the final bid offered and 
buy back the horse. Model-predicted prices for these buy-back horses indicate they 
are not undervalued by the final bids, based on their characteristics. 
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Introduction 
Limited economic research has been conducted pertaining to the show horse industry. 
Researchers typically have overlooked the  show horse industry in  favor of the racehorse 
industry. An  attraction to researchers  regarding thoroughbred  and quarter horse 
racehorses is  the amount of money spent on the  gambling aspect of the sport. However, 
the show horse industry also has a significant economic impact on society. There are 
over 6.9 million horses in the United States and 7.1  million people involved in the horse 
industry. Of the $25.3 billion in total goods and services directly produced by the horse 
industry, horse showing contributes over 25% (Barents Group, 1996).  Typical expenses 
include money spent on the horse, tack, hotel, food, entry fees, gas, vehicles, and the 
general care of the horse. In 2003, the American Quarter Horse Association (AQHA) 
sanctioned over 2,500 horse shows. Points earned at AQHA sanctioned shows allow 
riders to qualify for the World Show held each November in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 
One of the major events at  the World Show is the World Championship Sale. This con- 
signment sale of AQHA show horses regularly grosses over $3 million in sales annually 
(table 1). 
Horses are entered in the World Championship Sale as consigned animals by the 
seller. The seller pays a $400 entry fee for every horse entered in the sale and agrees to 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of AQHA World Championship Sale (1995-2002) 
Sale Price " 
Gross  Average  Minimum  Maximum  Count  Percent 
Year  ($)  ($)  ($)  ($)  (No.)  Sold (%) 
Sale Horses: 
2002  2,886,200  6,666  800  145,000  433  84.9 
2001  3,055,300  7,507  700  73,500  407  79.6 
2000  3,004,225  7,586  1,000  77,000  396  77.2 
1999  3,173,250  8,074  750  90,000  393  79.9 
1998  3,437,800  8,552  550  80,000  402  79.9 
1997  3,118,100  7,894  700  85,000  395  77.9 
1996  3,033,100  7,878  800  77,000  385  77.0 










"Final bid received for no-sale horses. 
pay 8%  of the final sale price of each horse as a commission to the auction company. The 
seller is responsible for providing information on the horse to be sold to the auction 
company for use in the sale catalog. Sale catalogs typically include detailed information 
on the horse's performance record, pedigree, and genetic and physical characteristics. 
In addition to the sale catalog, which is available approximately one month prior to the 
sale, buyers and sellers have the opportunity to interact prior to the sale in the barns 
and riding arenas located at  the World Show. Many buyers use the days prior to the sale 
to see prospective horses and inquire about the horses from owners and trainers. 
A common practice at many horse sales, including race horses, is the use of reserve 
prices, or "buying back" horses. Depending on the auction company, a seller may either 
enter a minimum (reservation)  price for the horse with the auctioneer prior to the sale 
or buy the horse back from the sale ring after all bids have been offered by potential 
buyers by  entering a final "buy-back" bid.  In either case, the seller determines a 
minimum acceptable price for the horse and does not have to sell the horse if bidding 
does not meet or exceed this minimum price. The World Championship Show uses the 
"buy-back" method and requires sellers to enter the fmal bid for their horse if they do 
not want the horse to sell for the last bid offered by a potential buyer. In this case, the 
horse is referred to as a "no-sale" horse, and there is no transfer of  ownership. The 
seller, however, is still required to pay the 8% commission on the final bid. The average 
number of no-sale horses at this sale is 20% per year over the period 1995-2002. 
Given the above discussion, two objectives were established for this study. The first 
is to quantify the price determinants  of show-quality  quarter horses sold at  public auction. Taylor et al.  Show Quality Quarter Horse Auctions  597 
The factors affecting show horse prices include genetic traits of  the horse, pedigree, 
performance in  the show ring, and economic conditions. The second objective is to deter- 
mine if there is a systematic difference in the horses that sell versus the horses that do 
not sell, which might help explain the  frequency of the buy-back method observed at  the 
World Championship Sale. 
Literature Review 
Early work using the basic hedonic pricing framework proposed the hypothesis that 
goods can be considered as  bundles of attributes,  and consumers value these goods based 
on their individual attributes (Lancaster, 1966; Griliches, 1971). The hedonic model 
considered here follows Rosen's  (1974) specification of  an implicit pricing model. To 
avoid the  identification problem noted by Rosen, it is assumed that  the supply of horses 
at auction is fixed, and therefore demand for heterogeneous characteristics of  horses 
determines the sale price. 
Hedonic models have been widely used to evaluate the implicit prices of many agricul- 
tural commodities, especially livestock. There are  many similarities between cattle and 
horse auctions, including an emphasis by sellers on genetic and phenotypic (physical) 
descriptions of animals to potential buyers. Thus, a review of the hedonic literature for 
cattle provides insight into the application  of  a hedonic model to horse auctions. 
Faminow and Gum (1986) considered short-run price differentials for feeder cattle sold 
at Arizona auctions. They argued that the supply of cattle at a given auction is fured, 
and therefore price is determined by demand for the individual characteristics of the 
cattle. Their findings showed that sex, weight, pen size, breed, sale year, and location, 
as well as interaction terms between sex and weight, affected sale price. 
Schroeder et al. (1988) used Kansas cattle auction data to analyze the effects of 
physical characteristics on price differentials between lots of feeder cattle. While the 
price differentials among lots reflect differences in supply and demand for cattle at 
different weight and grade categories, price premiums and discounts were also expected 
to reflect the demand for specific characteristics of each pen of cattle. Several attributes 
were found to affect price differentials including sex, weight, pen size, breed, and several 
conformation and health characteristics. Finally, sale order of  the pen was found to 
positively affect price as the sale progressed. In an earlier study, Buccola (1982) also 
tested the effect of sale order, but found a negative price impact as the sale progressed. 
However, the sale order for these pens was not random; rather, sales were ordered 
according to weight, grade, and breed. 
Dhuyvetter et al. (1996) estimated a hedonic pricing model for bulls which included 
bull attributes, information  on  expected progeny differences (EPDs), and bull sale 
marketing efforts. The EPDs considered in the model were not significant in explaining 
price variability for all breeds. Chvosta, Rucker, and Watts (2001) also included EPDs 
in their model  of  pre-sale data at bull auctions, and reported that older, simpler 
measures of performance provide more information on prices than the newer and more 
sophisticated EPDs. 
Hedonic pricing models have also been used extensively for determining the value of 
characteristics of thoroughbred racing horses. A recent study by Robbins and Kennedy 
(2001) reviews  the existing literature on  hedonic pricing  models of  thoroughbred 
yearling auctions. As the authors note, however, much of the literature uses data from 598  December 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
elite sales in Kentucky. Horses sold at these sales must meet strict guidelines for 
lineage and veterinary exam requirements, making the range in quality observed in the 
data very  small. Because these sales also have a high number of  foreign buyers, 
macroeconomic variables such as  exchange rates can influence sale prices. Robbins and 
Kennedy use data  from a regional horse market in British Columbia, Canada, to analyze 
a wider  quality distribution of  yearling horses and to avoid the factors that affect 
Kentucky horse markets exclusively.  Their results indicate that the effect of the sire on 
sale price is captured well by the stud fee, and male yearlings bring higher prices than 
female yearlings. Further, race horses bought in this regional market do not appear to 
win back their purchase price, and therefore could be described as consumption rather 
than investment goods. 
Lansford et al. (1998) used a semi-log hedonic pricing model to estimate the price of 
individual and ancestral characteristics of yearling quarter horses bred for racing. They 
note there has been little research pertaining to genetic and ancestral characteristics 
of quarter horses (i.e., pedigree) despite vast record keeping of ancestral information. 
The ancestral characteristics of the yearlings were described by racing performance of 
the yearling's sire and dam, as well as the racing performance of other offspring of the 
sire and dam. Racing performance was described as  both number of races won and total 
race winnings. The authors concluded that several genetic and ancestral characteristics 
influence the price paid for race-bred yearling quarter horses. 
Vickner and Koch  (2001) extended the work of  Lansford et al. by  considering a 
hedonic hammer price model for thoroughbred yearlings. The final auction hammer 
price included horses that did not reach the  reservation price set by the  consignor. Their 
hedonic model considered several variables including date of  sale, influence of  same- 
sired progeny, buyer visits to an on-site repository for health records, advertising, 
consignor size, and individual seller reputation effects. Only the first three variables 
were statistically significant in explaining hammer price at auction. 
Using a semilog hedonic pricing model, Neibergs (2001) analyzed thoroughbred 
broodmare characteristics. The characteristics examined were described as breeding, 
racing, genetic, and marketing factors. Breeding factors included stud fee of  covering 
sire and earnings of  foals produced by the mare. Genetic factors in the model were 
identified as the racing record of  siblings and a quality index for the mare's  sire. 
Marketing factors included whether or not the sale was a dispersal sale and a binary 
variable (RNA) if the horse failed to reach the reserve price (i.e., no-sale). For horses 
failing to reach the reserve price, the last competitive bid was used as the dependent 
variable. If the  RNA binary variable is negative, this implies the  broodmare would have 
a higher expected sale price based on its characteristics than the final competitive bid. 
However, the  RNA binary variable coefficient was not statistically significant. Neibergs 
therefore concluded there is no evidence that sale horses and no-sale horses differ, and 
consequently there is no support for the seller setting a reserve price above the final bid. 
Theoretical Model 
As noted previously, ownership of  some of the horses in the World Championship Sale 
did not actually change due to sellers who "buy back" their horses by entering the final 
bid. The final bid on a no-sale horse provides some information about the demand for 
that horse at auction because it is only slightly higher than the last bid offered by  a Taylor et al.  Show Quality Quarter Horse Auctions  599 
potential buyer.' Based on the relative frequency of the buy-back method observed for 
this horse sale, it could be argued that sellers have some justification for buying back 
certain horses. This reasoning may be a consequence of the seller not conveying enough 
information about the horse to the buyers, resulting in the buyers not valuing the  horse 
sufficiently to meet the seller's reservation price. In the case of young horses, it could 
be especially difficult for sellers to provide measurable evidence of  a horse's potential 
for performance in the arena or for breeding to potential buyers. The buy-back method 
may also simply be the result of an overvaluation by the seller, given the demand for 
certain characteristics by buyers at this auction. In  this case, the no-sale horses are  not 
innately different from the horses that sold, and the market prices offered should be 
consistent with the value of individual attributes measured by the hedonic model. 
For these reasons, we investigate the potential for observations on sale and no-sale 
horses to be generated by two different data processes. This is done by considering a 
Heckman sample selection model (Heckman, 1979). Following Greene (2003, pp. 782- 
7841, the Heckman procedure first requires the estimation of a probit model where the 
dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the horse sold and equal to 
zero if it did not sell. Therefore, the first-step equation for determining the sample 
selection is written as: 
where  zi  is a binary variable indicating if the horses sold, and wi is a vector of character- 
istics of each horse. Sale price is only observed when zi  is greater than zero so that the 
observations used in the hedonic pricing model are "selected" by equation (1). 
The equation for the second-step hedonic model is given by: 
wherep, is the sale price, and q  represents a vector of characteristics for each horse that 
includes at least one regressor not contained in wi to ensure identification (Maddala, 
1983, p. 229). The characteristics included in wi and xi are specified below in the empir- 
ical model section. The regressors excluded from the first-step estimation are those 
measuring sale order and sale order squared. These variables are dropped because, while 
they may affect the sale price, it is not expected that they will impact the probability of 
selling. Therefore, they do not appear in equation (11, but they do appear in the second- 
step estimation of equation (2).  Table 2 provides a listing ofvariable names and descrip- 
tions, and reports their summary statistics. 
Equation (2) is estimated using information on the sample selection from the estima- 
tion of equation (1).  Therefore, the sale price observed, given zi  is greater than zero, is 
modeled as follows: 
where a,  = -wiylo,,  Ua,) = @(w~ylo,)l@(w~yl~),  and@and@denote  thecumulative 
and probability density functions, respectively, of  the standard normal distribution. 
Recall the seller must pay a commission on the linal bid price of 8%,  and therefore has no incentive  to bid any higher than 
necessary to buy the horse back. 600  December 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 2. Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics (N  = 3,894) 
Std.  Min.  Max. 






























Offspring  WC 




Log of real sale price (real final bid price for no-sale horses) 
Binary variable equal to 1  if horse is a gelding 
Binary variable equal to 1  if horse is a mare 
Binary variable equal to 1  if horse is a stallion 
Age of horse (years) 
Gelding and age interaction term 
Gelding and age squared interaction term 
Mare and age interaction term 
Mare and age squared interaction term 
Stallion and age interaction term 
Stallion and age squared interaction term 
Binary variable for color of horse" 
Binary variable equal to 1  if horse is marketed as 
breeding stock 
Enrolled in or eligible for AQHA Incentive Fund 
Halter class and horse not tested for HYPP interaction 
term 
Halter class and horse is homozygous negative for 
HYPP interaction term 
Halter class and horse is heterozygous for HYPP 
interaction term 
Halter class 
Hunter under saddle class 
Western pleasure class 
One or more classes 
Other class 
AQHA points earnedlyear 
Non-AQHA points earnedlyear 
Registers of  merit earnedlyear 
Superior ratings earnedlyear 
AQHA World Show championshipslyear 
AQHA World Show placingslyear 
Championships or placings at  AQHA futuritieslyear 
Championships or placings at non-AQHA showslyear 
Offspring that have won points 
Offspring with AQHA World Show championship 
Offspring with AQHA World Show placing 
Offspring with ROM, SUP, or futurity championship or 
placing 
Rank of  sire for western pleasure 
Binary variable equal to 1  if sire is ranked for western 
pleasure 
Rank of sire for hunter under saddle 
Binary variable equal to 1  if sire is ranked for hunter 
under saddle 
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Rank of  sire for halter 
Mean 
5.68 
Binary variable equal to 1  if sue  is ranked 
for halter 
DSire  WPRank 
DSire WPRankBV 
Rank of  dam's sire for western pleasure 
Binary variable equal to 1  if dam's sue  is 
ranked for western pleasure 
Rank of  dam's sire for hunter under saddle 
Binary variable equal to 1  if dam's sue  is 
ranked for hunter under saddle 
Rank of  dam's sire for halter 
Binary variable equal to 1  if dam's sire is 
ranked for halter 
SSireWPRank 
SSire  WPRankBV 
Rank of  service sire for western pleasure 
Binary variable equal to 1  if service sire is 
ranked for western pleasure 
Rank of  service sire for hunter under saddle 
Binay variable equal to 1  if service sue  is 
ranked for hunter under saddle 
Rank of  senice sire for halter 
Binary variable equal to 1  if service sire is 





Sale order within class 
Sale order within class, squared 
Sale year (binary variable used in model) 
Binary variable equal to 1  if horse sold 
"Color categories are Bay, Black, Brown, Chestnut, Gray, Palomino, Redroan, Sorrel, and Colorother. 
Statistical significance of  the P,  coefficient in this model is evidence in favor of  sample 
selection and the hypothesis that observations on no-sale and sale horses are coming 
from different data-generating processes. 
The Heckman model was estimated using LIMDEP (Econometric Software, Inc., 
2002). The results from the first-step probit model estimation of  equation (1)  are 
presented in table 3. The second-step estimation results are not presented to conserve 
space. However, the results of the second-step estimation reveal the sample selection 
hypothesis proposed for the auction data is not supported because the coefficient on the 
lambda term (P,)  is not statistically significant. This finding suggests the no-sale horses 
are not statistically different from the sale horses. Given that sample selection is not 
necessary, a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression including all the data is 
sufficient to estimate the hedonic pricing model. However, the intuitive arguments 
mentioned above do provide some support for the hypotheses of systematic differences 
between the two groups of horses. Based on these arguments, the no-sale horses are set 
aside during the OLS estimation. With a relatively large number of observations on sale 
horses, it is then possible to perform out-of-sample  predictions of the sale price for the 
no-sale horses, given their individual attributes. 602  December 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 3. Probit Model Regression Results (first step of Heckman model) 
[dependent variable = SALE] 
Parameter  Standard 
Variable  Estimate  Error  t-Statistic  p-Value 
Constant  0.8583 
Genetic and Physical Characteristics: 
G *Age  0.0705 
G *Age2  -0.0110 
M *Age  -0.0134 
M *Age2  0.0005 
S *Age  -0.0664 
S *Age2  0.0045 
Gelding  0.0117 
Stallion  -0.0625 
Bay  0.0189 
Black  0.3275 
Brown  -0.1350 
Chestnut  -0.1303 
Gray  -0.0140 
Palomino  0.0152 
Redroan  0.0894 
ColorOther  -0.0565 
Bred  0.0208 
H *NoTest  -0.1748 
H*NH  -0.0398 
Performance Characteristics: 
Incentive  0.0186 
HUS  -0.0618 
WP  -0.1308 
Allaround  -0.1195 
ClassOther  -0.2448 
Points  -0.0158 
NonPoints  0.0091 
ROM  0.0866 
Superior  1.4984 
WorldC  -0.1689 
WorldP  0.0037 
Futurity  0.0611 
NonCP  -0.4950 
OffpringP  -0.0280 
Offspring  WC  -0.0317 
OffspringWP  -0.0148 
Offspringother  -0.0007 
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Table 3. Continued 
Variable 
Parameter  Standard 




























Empirical Model Specification 
The hedonic pricing function used in this study considers the influence of a vector of char- 
acteristics of a horse on the sale price at public auction. Sale price is a function of genetic 
and phenotypic (physical)  characteristics, pedigree, performance, sale order, and economic 
conditions. Physical characteristics of  a horse, such as conformation, demeanor, and 
general appearance, are not easily recorded in a sale catalog and must be determined 
upon inspection of the horse prior to or during the sale. For this reason, not all physical 
characteristics are included in the model. The general specification of the model is: 
(4)  In[REAL.Pl = f  (Genetic and  Physical Traits, Individual 
Performance, Performance of  Offspring, 
Quality of  Pedigree, Sale Order, Year ), 
where REALP is the real sale price of the horse and In denotes natural logarithm. 604  December 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Genetic and Physical Traits denotes a group of  variables that describe the genetic 
makeup and physical characteristics of the horse including age, color, sex, whether or 
not it is a bred mare (in foal), and the presence of genetic diseases. To allow for a non- 
linear age effect by sex, variables measuring age and age squared enter the empirical 
model as interaction terms with sex (mare, stallion, or gelding). This allows for the 
differences in breeding potential between mares and stallions as well as the absence of 
breeding potential for geldings. Age is expected to be positively related to price, but at 
a decreasing rate. Horse color is categorized as binary variables with sorrel being the 
default. There is no a priori expectation of the effect of color on price. A dummy variable 
for mares that are currently bred is included. A bred mare is expected to bring a higher 
value than a mare not currently in foal. A genetic disease of  concern to show horse 
owners and breeders is hyperkalemic periodic paralysis (HYPP).2  This variable enters 
the model as a binary variable interacted with the halter class binary variable because 
the disease is primarily found in horses bred for halter classes. The interaction term of 
halter class and testing negative for HYPP (n/n gene) was the default. 
Individual Performance represents a group of variables describing the show record 
of  the horse being sold. Each horse is categorized into one of  five primary classes: 
western pleasure, hunter under saddle, halter, all-around (multiple classes), or other 
(cutting, reigning, or roping). A binary variable for each class is included in the model 
with the exception of halter class, which is the default. There are no a priori expecta- 
tions for the class variables. Continuous variables are included for points earned at 
AQHA shows, points earned at non-AQHA shows, number of World Show champion- 
ships, number of World Show top placings, number of futurities won, and  championships 
or placings at non-AQHA events. In addition to points earned at shows, horses can 
qualify for awards based on the number of points earned in specific events. Continuous 
variables for number of registers of merit, which require 10  points in a single event, and 
the number of  superior ratings, which require 50 points in a single event, are included 
in the model. Since the age of the  horses in this sale varies from yearlings to horses over 
20 years old, some horses have been eligible for competition longer than others. To 
account for this variance in years eligible for competition, the variables for points, 
awards earned, and any championships or placings at shows are divided by the age of 
the  horse to arrive at  a measure of individual performance per year of competition. Each 
of the variables measuring Individual Performance is expected to positively influence 
a horse's value. Finally, a binary variable is included for horses that are enrolled in or 
eligible for the AQHA Incentive Fund. If an incentive fund horse wins at an AQHA 
show, the rider and owner will receive a monetary award in addition to points. The 
expected sign for this variable is positive. 
Performance of Offspring  denotes variables describing the performance record of the 
offspring of  the horse being sold. It includes continuous variables for the number of 
offspring that  have earned AQHA points, won World Show championships, placed at  the 
World Show, or won championships or placed at other horse shows or futurities. 
Quality of  Pedigree is a measure of the strength of  a horse's lineage. While the sale 
catalogs provide detailed information on the lineage of the horse, the strength of  the 
HYPP  is an inherited disease of the muscle, which is caused by a genetic defect. The gene occurs primarily in horses bred 
for halter classes (where  heavy muscling is desired)  and can cause sudden paralysis or death in an animal carrying the gene. 
Horses will carry either the nln gene (no HYPP), the n/h  gene (50%  chance of passing on to offspring), or the hh  gene (100% 
chance of passing HYPP on to offspring). Testing for the gene has been required on new foals by the AQHA since 1998. 
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pedigree is hard to determine without first-hand knowledge of  the reputation of  the 
various sires and dams. Most breeders use rankings of sires based on lifetime earnings 
of offspring to distinguish among the reputations of various sires. These rankings are 
listed by class (i.e., western pleasure, hunter under saddle, and halter) and are  included 
for the sire of the horse, the sire of the horse's dam, and the service sire's ranking.3 Sire 
rankings are calculated as both a continuous variable of the actual rank and a binary 
variable equal to one if the sire is ranked in the top 100 horses and zero otherwise. 
Sale Order is a continuous variable corresponding to the order in which the horses 
were sold at  each year's sale. The horses are assigned a sale order or "hip number" by 
alphabetical listing of  the first dam's name within two groups, halter and all other 
performance horses. Therefore, the sale order variable is the random order in which a 
horse was sold within one of these two groups. To allow for a nonlinear effect by sale 
order, the continuous variable enters the empirical model as sale order and sale order 
squared. Due to the random sale order of the horses at  the World Championship Sale, 
there are no prior expectations for the signs of these variables. 
The variable Year represents year of sale and is modeled as a series of binary varia- 
bles to capture  the  general effect of the overall economy (2001  is the default year). (Refer 
to table 2 for a listing of variable names and descriptions.) 
Data 
Summary statistics of  the prices are reported by sale year in table 1, and summary 
statistics for the variables used in the model are provided in table 2. Sale prices and 
final bids were collected for the World Championship Sale from Professional Auction 
Services, Inc., which conducted the sale each of the years in the data set. The sale data 
included 3,911 observations from the time period 1995-2002.  Six observations were 
dropped because the horses did not show up for the sale. Eight horses in the data set 
were ranked themselves on the all-time sire list for one of  the three classes. These 
horses were considered outliers and were dropped from the data set. Only three horses 
tested positive for the HYPP gene, so these horses were also dropped from the sample. 
Of  the 3,894 observations remaining, 3,090 (79%) horses sold and 804 (21%) were 
no-sale horses. To account for inflation, sale prices and final bids were inflated to 2002 
values using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
Data on the top 100 sires ranked by lifetime earnings of offspring were collected for 
each sale year from Equi-Stat. The ranking data are  assigned to each observation based 
on the sale year. This is meant to reflect the current information on sire rankings 
available to buyers and sellers prior to the sale. All other data used in the model were 
collected from the sale catalogs for the respective sale years. 
Results of the Hedonic Pricing Model 
The hedonic pricing function is estimated by OLS and uses only the observations on 
horses that sold. The results of the regression are presented in table 4. Due to the semi- 
logarithmic form of the regression, the coefficients for the binary variables are trans- 
formed as follows: 
Some of the mares sold at  this auction are sold "in foal" or currently bred. The service sire is the sire to which the mare 
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Table 4. OLS Hedonic Model Regression Results 
[dependent variable = ln(REALP)] 
Parameter  Standard  Transformed 
Variable  Estimate  Error  t-Statistic  p-Value  Parameter Est." 
Constant  7.8608  0.0770  102.1400  0.0001  - 
Genetic and Physical Characteristics: 















Incentive  0.0826  0.0321  2.5700  0.0101  0.0855 
HUS  0.0951  0.0549  1.7300  0.0835  0.0981 
Allaround  -0.0431  0.0570  -0.7600  0.4499  -0.0437 
Points  0.0187  0.0049  3.8200  0.0001  - 
NonPoints  0.0055  0.0040  1.4000  0.1625  - 
ROM  0.3688  0.1296  2.8500  0.0045  - 
Superior  0.6400  0.4073  1.5700  0.1162  - 
WorldC  0.5016  0.3056  1.6400  0.1008  - 
WorldP  0.4188  0.1063  3.9400  0.0001  - 
Futurity  0.0990  0.0350  2.8300  0.0047  - 
Non CP  0.3863  0.1949  1.9800  0.0476  - 
OffspringP  0.0393  0.0194  2.0300  0.0426  - 
OffspringWC  0.0805  0.0282  2.8500  0.0043  - 
Offspring  WP  0.0345  0.0228  1.5100  0.1301  - 
Offspringother  0.0406  0.0167  2.4300  0.0153  - 
( continued . . . Taylor et al.  Show Quality Quarter Horse Auctions  607 
Table 4. Continued 
Variable 
Parameter  Standard  Transformed 































R  = 0.2938 
RMSE  = 0.6599 
Degrees of Freedom  =  3,027 
"Binary variable coefficients  transformed according to Kennedy (1981). 
(5)  g*  = exp(c^  - 0.5~(c^))  - 1, 
where  c^ is the estimated coefficient of the binary variable, and V(c^)  is an estimate of the 
variance of  2 (Kennedy, 1981).  These transformed coefficients for the binary variables 
are also presented in table 5, and the following interpretation of  the estimation uses 
these transformed coefficients for the binary variables. 608  December 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 5. Summary Statistics of Predicted Market Prices 
Standard  Minimum  Maximum 
Description  Average  Deviation  Value  Value 
Sale Horses: n 
ln(REALP) - [ln(REALP)I  0.00  0.65  -2.52  2.90 
P - (P)  $135.45  $8,465.33  -$64,527.99  $155,767.66 
RMSE  0.65 
% Predicted Prices Above Sale Price  65.18 
No-Sale Horses: n 
ln(REALFB  ) - [ln(REALFB)]  0.0858  0.61  -2.07  2.48 
Final  Bid - (~ina%id)  $477.24  $7,224.01  -$21,673.80  $63,770.96 
RMSE  0.61 
% Predicted Prices Above Final Bid  61.07 
Genetic and  Physical Characteristics 
The coefficients for age and age squared of mares (M*Age, M*Age2) and stallions 
(S  *Age, S  *Age2)  are significant. The positive sign on the linear term and negative sign 
on the squared term indicate that price increases as  mares and stallions get older, but 
at  a decreasing rate. Figure 1  shows the model-predicted effect of age on market price 
by sex (a more detailed discussion of  the model-predicted prices is presented in the 
following section). The signs of  the coefficients may be suggesting that the value of 
mares and stallions increases as their show careers progress, but will eventually fall 
off when they are used only for breeding later in life. The coefficients for Gelding and 
Stallion were negative and statistically different from zero, indicating that mares 
receive a premium of 22.4% and 29.4% over geldings and stallions, respectively. 
All of the coefficients for color were significant, except Chestnut, and had a positive 
sign, suggesting the  default color (Sorrel)  is less preferred to other colors. The coefficient 
for Bred was not statistically different from zero. The model predicts that horses 
registered in or eligible for the incentive fund (Incentive)  receive a premium of 8.6% over 
horses that are not eligible. This program allows riders and ownersibreeders to receive 
money for points earned at  AQHA shows. Therefore, the positive effect on the sale price 
of a horse is expected. The only interaction term between the halter class and the HYPP 
gene which was significant was the term describing a halter class horse that tested n/h 
for HYPP (see footnote 2). The marginal effect of the H*NH  coefficient indicates that a 
halter horse with the n/h gene will bring 11.8%  more than a halter horse testing nega- 
tive for the HYPP gene. This marginal effect may be the result of breeders or owners 
who continue to take the risk of a horse getting HYPP in return for heavier muscling, 
which is highly valued in halter classes. 
Individual Performance 
Of  the binary variables denoting the primary class of  the horse, the coefficients for 
ClassOther and HUS were significant. Horses in western pleasure, or the all-around Taylor et al.  Show Quality Quarter Horse Auctions  609 
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Figure 1. Model-predicted effect of age on market price by sex 
(all other characteristics  evaluated at the mean of the series for 
gelding, stallion, and mare) 
class do not have a significant premium or discount relative to halter horses, while 
horses in the  hunter under saddle (HUS)  class are predicted to have a premium of 9.8% 
over halter class horses. The significant and positive sign on the ClassOther variable 
indicates the  possibility of a different set of buyers for the  performance horses (cutting, 
reigning, or roping). 
Several of the individual performance variables describing the  horse's record per year 
of competition were significant. Specifically,  points earned at  AQHA shows (Points),  the 
number of awards (ROM), the number of championships or top placings at the World 
Show, the  number of futurity championships or placings, and the number of champion- 
ships or  placings  at non-AQHA  shows (WorldC, WorldP, Futurity, NonCP) were 
significant and positive. An additional point earned per year of competition increases 
sale price by 1.9%. An additional register of  merit earned per year of  competition, 
requiring 10 points in a single class, increases the sale price of  a horse by 36.9%. A 
World Show championship (top  placing) increased price by 50.2%  (41.9%),  while winning 
or placing  at a futurity or non-AQHA event increased  price by  9.9% and 38.6%, 
respectively. Based on these marginal effects,  buyers consider the show record of a horse 
and are willing to bid higher for horses with a proven show record. 
Performance of  Offspring 
All of the  variables measuring the  performance of the horses' offspring (if they had any) 
were positive and significant, except a top placing at  the World Show. A horse having 
an additional offspring that has earned AQHA points at any time during its career 
increases the sale price  by  3.9%, while  an additional World  Show championship 
increases sale price by 8.1%.  Each horse's offspring that  has received an award (register 
of merit, superior rating) or won a championship at  a futurity or other event during its 
career increases the sale price of that horse by 4.1%. 6 10  December 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Western Pleasure 
Halter 
0  2  0  4  0  60  8  0  100 
Rank 
Figure 2. Model-predicted premium for a ranked sire by class 
(all other characteristics  evaluated at the mean of the series for 
western pleasure and halter) 
Quality of  Pedigree 
The ranking of a horse's sire was broken out by class: western pleasure, hunter under 
saddle, and halter. For western pleasure, a sire ranked in the top 100 (SireWPRankBV) 
adds 39.3% to the sale price. The continuous variable for sire rank (SireWPRank) 
shows the sale price falls  by 0.33%  for a one unit increase in rank (the  best rank possible 
is 1  and the worst is 100). This relationship indicates that the premium of  having a 
ranked sire in western pleasure is reduced from 39.3% to 6.3% as the level at  which 
the sire is ranked falls from 1  to 100. For hunter under saddle, the binary variable 
(SireHUSRankBV) was significant and adds 15.6% to the sale price. The continuous 
variable was not statistically significant. For horses with sires ranked in the  halter class 
(SireHALTRankBV), the added value is 21.6%. The continuous variable (SireHALT- 
Rank) reveals that the premium from having a ranked sire in halter decreases 0.20% 
for each decline in rank from 1  to 100, resulting in the premium being reduced to 1.6% 
as the sire ranking falls to 100. Figure 2 shows the change in the predicted premium for 
a ranked sire in western pleasure or halter classes as the rank declines from 1  to 100. 
For horses whose dam's sire was ranked in the western pleasure class (DSireWP- 
RankBV),  the sale price increases by 11.5%.  The other variables for dam's sire ranking 
were not statistically different from zero. 
For bred mares with service sires that were ranked in the western pleasure class 
(SSireWPRankBV), the sale price is increased by 22.3% and declines 0.36% for each fall 
in rank from 1  to 100 (SSireWPRank).  The premium associated with being ranked in 
western pleasure is reduced to zero by the 62nd ranked horse. The ranking of a service 
sire in the  hunter under saddle  class (SSireHUSRank,  SSireHUSRankBV)  was not 
significantly different from zero. For mares with service sires ranked in the halter class 
(SSireHALTRankBV),  the sale price is 58.6% higher and the price declines by 0.47% for 
each fall in rank from 1  to 100 (SSireHALTRank). The premium is reduced to 11.6%  for 
a service sire in the halter class at  the last ranking (100th). Taylor et al.  Show Quality Quarter Horse Auctions  6 1 1 
Sale Order 
Figure 3. Effect of sale order on sale price 
Sale Order 
The coefficient for sale order by  class (SOClass)  was statistically significant and posi- 
tive. The coefficient for sale order by class squared (SOClass2)  was not significant. The 
positive sign on the linear term and negative sign on the squared term indicate that 
price increases the farther into a sale a horse is sold, but at a decreasing rate. This 
quadratic relationship likely describes the change in attitude of buyers over the dura- 
tion of  the sale because the order of  horses sold is random and therefore not impacted 
by higher valued horses being placed intentionally at the end of  the sale. Figure 3 
presents the effect of  sale order on price. 
Year 
The binary variables for year were included to account for general economic conditions. 
The coefficients for 1995,1997,1998, and 1999 were significant and positive. The base 
year for comparison is 2001, implying that horses with identical characteristics sold for 
14.2%, 11.7%, 13.4%,  and 19.8% more in the years 1995,1997,1998,  and 1999, respec- 
tively, than in 2001. The coefficient for 2002 was also significant, but the negative sign 
reveals that horses sold in 2002 received 9.1% less than an identical horse sold in 2001. 
The year coefficients for 1996 and 2000 were not significant in explaining the variation 
in price for horses sold. The signs of  the significant coefficients indicate generally good 
economic conditions for horse buyers until 2001, after which economic conditions were 
not favorable for expenditures on this type of  "luxury" good. 
Explaining the Buy-Back Method 
Predicted Sale Prices 
Using the parameter estimates from the hedonic pricing model, the expected sale prices 
for the no-sale horses are predicted. The summary statistics ofthe residuals between the 6 12  December 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
n 
observations on the sale price, ln(REALP),  and the  predicted sale price, [ln(REALP)I of 
the sale horses are presented in table 5. The residuals for the no-sale horses are also 
presented using the observed final bid  and their predicted sale price. The average 
residual for the no-sale horses is 0.0858, showing the observed final bid price is 8.6% 
larger than the predicted sale price, on average, for the no-sale sample. 
It may be easier to understand these results if the predicted logs of  the prices are 
transformed to levels for comparison to the final sale bids. Due to bias in the transfor- 
mation of a semilogarithmic linear model, an adjustment is applied to the transforma- 
tion (Miller, 1984). The transformation is as  follows: 
where 6'  is the model root mean squared error. 
Once the predicted sale prices for the sale and no-sale horses are transformed, the 
average residuals between the observed price or final bid and the predicted sale price 
are $135.45 for sale horses and $477.24 for no-sale horses. While the average residuals 
suggest the predicted sale prices for both groups of horses are lower than the observed 
price, table 5 shows the percentage of all the horses predicted to have sale prices higher 
than the observed price or final bid. According to this measure, approximately 65% of 
the sale horses had predicted prices above the observed price. Similarly, for no-sale 
horses, approximately 61% of  the observations had predicted prices higher than the 
observed final bid. Taken alone, this measure suggests 61% of  the no-sale horses were 
undervalued by bidders at  the auction. However, this measurement is very comparable 
to the model's prediction of  65% of  the sale horses being undervalued as well. While 
these measures confirm the accuracy of the OLS model predictions, comparison of the 
measures between the two groups suggests there is  very little difference in the predicted 
sale prices between the sale horses and no-sale horses. Therefore, it does not appear 
that the no-sale horses were consistently undervalued by the final bid, based on their 
characteristics. 
Probit Model Results 
While the predicted prices do not suggest a systematic difference between the sale and 
no-sale horses, it may be useful to revisit the first-step estimates of the Heckman model. 
The probit estimates identify characteristics of horses making them more likely to sell. 
Of the 63 regressors used in the probit model, only 10 were statistically significant at 
the 10%  level or better. Of the significant coefficients, two were individual performance 
regressors-Points  and Superior. Based on the negative coefficient for Points, horses 
with a higher number of  points earned per year of  competition are less likely to sell, 
while the positive coefficient for Superior suggests additional superior ratings will 
increase the probability of selling.  There were also two annual binary variables, Year1995 
and Year2000, which had positive effects on the probability of selling. The relatively low 
number of regressors displaying explanatory power provides little insight into why some 
of  the horses sold and others were bought back by  the seller. Again, there does not 
appear to be a measurable, systematic difference  in the characteristics of the sale versus 
no-sale horses. Taylor et al.  Show Quality Quarter Horse Auctions  6 13 
Other Activities 
While the model is unable to capture any empirical differences between the two groups 
of horses entering the auction ring, there are several explanations for why sellers may 
choose not to sell their horses at auction, beyond the value of the horse's characteristics. 
Some sellers may have information on the horses' expected show or breeding perform- 
ance that is difficult to express to potential buyers through the catalog or pre-sale 
viewing. This inefficiency in the flow of  information could cause buyers to undervalue 
a horse relative to the seller's reservation price. Conversations  with individuals in the 
show and performance horse industry also suggest the possibility that deals are being 
made outside the sale ring, and some of the no-sale horses are actually being sold at a 
later time.4  Another possible explanation for no-sale horses is overvaluation by sellers. 
Some sellers may simply ignore the market signals from buyers at the auction and 
decide their horse is "too valuable" to sell at the final bid price. 
Conclusions 
Knowing how individual characteristics of horses-ranging  from genetic characteristics 
to performance discipline to pedigree-impact  prices is critical information for both 
buyers and sellers of  quarter horses. Buyers desire this information in order to make 
informed purchase decisions possibly reducing the risk associated with their invest- 
ments. Likewise, sellers desire this information so they can make breeding decisions to 
capture the traits most demanded by buyers. 
Several of  the genetic traits, as well as age, color, and sex, impacted sale price. For 
mares and stallions, the positive relationship between age and price declines as the 
horse ages. The coefficients on sex revealed that mares receive a premium relative to 
both geldings and stallions. This likely is due to both their breeding potential, as com- 
pared to geldings, and their tendency to be easier to handle in the show ring after they 
have started their breeding career. Stallions tend to be much harder to work with after 
their breeding life has begun. 
Each of the statistically significant variables measuring a horse's performance posi- 
tively impacted sale price. Clearly,  buyers value horses with distinguished show records 
not only for their potential in the show ring, but also for their future value as  breeding 
animals. Enrollment in or eligibility for the AQHA Incentive Fund also increases the 
sale prices of  horses. 
A strong pedigree is valuable for show horses, as confirmed by the positive effect of 
the performance of  offspring and the ranking of  sires, dams' sires, or service sires. 
Pedigree is likely to be a significant factor in many breeding programs because it is a 
valuable trait desired by buyers in the market. 
Horses are considered a luxury good, and expenditures in the horse industry may be 
affected by the condition of  the economy. The binary variables used for each sale year 
indicate that the first five years of  the sample were generally good economic years for 
sale prices and the last two were relatively less favorable for the purchase of  show 
horses. 
* While this type of activity is certainly possible, F'rofessional Auction Services does have regulations in place to prohibit 
sales outside the auction ring. To the extent they are able to enforce these regulations, this practice may not be affecting  very 
many of  the no-sale observations in the sample. 6 14  December 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
While the effect of  sale order has been considered in other studies, these particular 
data offer a unique opportunity to evaluate the effect of  order on price when order is 
determined randomly. As shown by the coefficients on sale order, price increases as the 
sale progresses. Unlike sales where the auctioneer or sellers arrange the order to sell 
their best horses first, this positive effect can be attributed to buyers. It appears that 
buyers "hold back somewhat at  the beginning of a sale, perhaps to evaluate the market 
conditions for the auction as well as the characteristics of  the horses themselves. 
In addition to identifying the individual characteristics affecting show horse value, 
this study also sought to explain the use of  the buy-back practice of  sellers by consid- 
ering differences in characteristics between horses that sold and those that were bought 
back. The results of the predicted sale prices for the no-sale horses suggest these horses 
are not systematically undervalued by the final bid at  auction as compared to the horses 
that did sell. Also, the results of  the probit model provide very little explanation of 
inherent differences between the two groups based on measurable characteristics. 
The relative frequency of  the buy-back practice is an aspect of  these auctions that 
remains unexplained by this model, which is only able to consider characteristics of the 
horses. Future research could address some of the possible explanations for why sellers 
use the buy-back method at auction by including information on the characteristics of 
the sellers themselves. This approach will allow more extensive investigation into the 
trend of no-sale horses commonly observed at  auctions for show-quality quarter horses. 
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